Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will drive pro¯ts down to zero. This paper shows that pro¯ts may remain bounded away from zero when¯rms have to make a negligible small investment to learn the demand.
Introduction
Potential competition or the threat of entry is often considered to be as powerful as actual competition. Can¯rms make positive pro¯ts in the presence of potential entrants? When incumbent¯rms have no commitment power to deter entry, one would think that pro¯ts will indeed be driven down to zero. Let us illustrate this in a very simple entry game in a homogeneous good market where¯rms incur a¯xed set-up cost K . Firms¯rst decide whether or not to enter and incur this¯xed cost. After observing the number of¯rms that entered, all¯rms play a Cournot game. Assuming symmetry amongst¯rms, each rm's Cournot payo® (apart from the set-up cost) will be a decreasing function of the number of¯rms that enters, ¼(N). Ignoring the integer problem,¯rms will enter up to the point where pro¯ts equal set-up cost, i.e. where ¼(N ¤ ) = K and end up having zero pro¯t. If we take the integer problem into account, the number of entrants could be fractionally less, and pro¯ts will be positive, but small (\almost zero").
The present paper shows, however, that pure pro¯ts in a free entry equilibrium are possible, even when the market is for a homogeneous good and no¯rm has any advantage over any other¯rm. We assume that all¯rms initially face uncertainty about the demand curve, although they all have the opportunity (before entry decisions are taken) to resolve their uncertainty at a very small cost. The reader might have expected that this perturbation of the model would not overturn the zero pro¯t result described in the previous paragraph as, intuitively, it seems probable that¯rms will resolve their uncertainty before entry decisions are taken. However, as will be shown below, the fact that information acquisitions are not observed implies that an entrant may optimally and rationally decide to stay out, even knowing that the market is large enough for two competing¯rms and that only one¯rm enters. More generally, the number of¯rms that enter may be strictly less than the number of¯rms needed to drive pro¯ts down to (almost) zero.
Entry with Sunk Costs and Stochastic Demand
There are n¸2¯rms. They have to decide whether to enter in a new market. Inverse demand in this market is given by p = x + y ¡ q, where q denotes the total production and where both x and y are stochastic. We assume that the two random variables are independent, and that each can take a high or low value: x is equal to x H or x L , with probability ® and 1 ¡ ®, respectively. Similarly, y is equal to y H or y L , with probabilitȳ
Firms can become informed about the realization of (some of) these variables, at a small cost of " > 0 per variable. After observing the privately gathered information, each¯rm decides whether or not to enter this market, which implies that a cost K has to be sunk. After observing who entered, the¯rms that entered compete in the usual Cournot fashion. We assume that production is at zero cost.
We assume that the variables satisfy the following 4 assumptions:
These assumptions imply that the demand function is such that when x is high, two competing¯rms will be able to recover their entry cost. The market is never large enough to support three competing¯rms so we may assume without loss of generality that there are only two potential entrants, A and B.
1 When x is low and y is high, two competinḡ rms will not be able to recover the entry cost, but a single¯rm exercising monopoly power will recover the entry cost. Finally, in the state where both x and y are low, not even a monopolist would recover its cost.
The Examples
Example 1. Let ® =¯= 1=2 and
Proposition 1. The information acquisition and entry game given by the parameters in Example 1 exhibits a sequential equilibrium in which only one¯rm enters in the highlow state. In particular, the following strategies and beliefs form such a sequential
Firm A learns x, and enters only when it is high. If he does not meet a competitor,
A believes that the high-low state occurred and produces the monopoly quantity (x H + y L )=2 = 11. If he does meet a competitor, A believes that the high-high state prevailed and produces the Cournot quantity (
Firm B learns y and enters only when it is high. If he does not meet a competitor, B believes that the low-high state occurred and produces (x L + y H )=2 = 9. If he does meet a competitor, B believes that the high-high state prevailed and produces (x H + y H )=3 =
28=3.
Proof. Note that all information sets are reached with positive probability. Firms update their beliefs after observing whether the other¯rm has entered. If the other¯rm enters then it must mean that he has`good' information; if he does not enter, it means that he has`bad' information. Beliefs are therefore consistent. It su±ces now to check that the strategies are sequentially rational, given the beliefs.
It is clear that¯rms make positive pro¯ts whenever they have decided to enter, and that their production levels maximize their pro¯ts given the decision of the other rm. The only deviations that might be pro¯table are (1) for¯rm A to get complete information and enter additionally in the case of low x and high y; (2) for¯rm B to get completely informed and enter additionally in the case of high x and low y. It is obvious that deviation 1 is not pro¯table. After observing entry in this state,¯rm B will believe that both variables are high and will therefore produce (
18.78, which is certainly not enough to cover the entry cost of 50.
Deviation 2 is not pro¯table either. By the same reasoning as before, entry by¯rm B will imply that¯rm A believes demand is very high and produces (x H + y H )=3 = 28=3.
The optimal production level for¯rm B is, therefore, (x H +y L ¡ 28=3)=2 = 19=3, yielding a pro¯t of 40.11, which is again not enough to cover the entry cost. 2
This example thus shows that there exists a sequential equilibrium of the information acquisition and entry game in which in the high-low state only one¯rm will enter, when in fact two¯rms competing µ a la Cournot would make pro¯ts. Even zero information cost does not destroy this equilibrium. The result is driven by the fact that when¯rm B deviates and enters in the high-low state,¯rm A is deceived and overestimates demand, which in turn leads to overproduction (relative to the Cournot equilibrium) which makes entry not pro¯table for the deviating¯rm, at least for some range of the parameters.
Notice that in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, all information sets are reached with positive probability. Beliefs are determined by Bayes' rule and are not exogenously and carefully designed to support the equilibrium strategies. Hence, this equilibrium will satisfy any re¯nements of sequential equilibrium based on restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs (such as the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) ).
Consider a small variation of our model of information acquisition. Suppose that rms can also gather information after entry has taken place but before production is determined. This variation does not destroy the validity of Proposition 1. Namely,¯rms will not¯nd it optimal to spend money to do late research, since Bayesian updating along the equilibrium path already yields full information.
One might believe that the fact that¯rms become (at¯rst) only partially informed is crucial. The next example shows that this is not true.
Example 2. Let ® = 1=10,¯= 1=2, and
(Note that assumptions (A1)|(A4) are satis¯ed.) 3 We will round o® all payo®s to two decimals. Proof. Let us check that the beliefs are consistent. Consider the possibility that¯rm B trembles with small probability ±, in which case he does not gather information and decides to enter. When he does not meet a competitor he produces (x L + y L )=2 = 7, when he does meet a competitor he produces 373=51. Let all other pure information acquisition and entry decisions occur with probability of order ± 2 . When¯rm A meets a competitor when demand is high-high, he will assign probability of almost 1 to the event that¯rm B did not tremble. When¯rm A meets a competitor when demand is high-low or low-high, belief revision will imply that¯rm A believes with probability of almost 1 that¯rm B trembled and entered without having gathered information. As ± ! 0 the fully mixed strategy pair converges to (s A ; s B ), while the beliefs generated by the fully mixed strategy pair converge to the beliefs described above.
Now we have to check that the strategies s A , s B are sequentially rational, given the beliefs. It is clear that¯rm A's strategy is optimal along the equilibrium path. How much should¯rm A produce in case he meets a competitor when demand is high-low or low-high? When¯rm B has trembled and¯nds himself in the situation where he entered without having gathered information and meeting a competitor, he will discard the possibility of a low-low demand state. He will update his beliefs using Bayes' rule:
Now it can be veri¯ed that
The strategy of¯rm A is indeed optimal, given the beliefs. Firm B's strategy is also optimal along the equilibrium path. However, we have to consider whether a deviation by entering in the high-low or low-high state of demand is pro¯table. The best production level for¯rm B after entering in the high-low demand
It is therefore not pro¯table to deviate and to enter in the case of high-low demand, given the expectations of¯rm A. Similarly, entering in the low-high state is not pro¯table since the optimal production level would be equal to (x L + y H ¡ q lh A )=2 = 1393=204, and the loss (¼ ¡23:37) would be even greater.
2
In this example¯rms learn demand perfectly in equilibrium. However, in the high-low state of demand only¯rm A enters. Were¯rm B to deviate and enter in this state, then rm A would be faced with an unexpected event and might believe that¯rm B made a mistake and entered without having gathered information. The uninformed¯rm B would then assign relatively high probability to the low-high state, and produce only 373=51 ¼ 7:31, which is less than the production level of a Cournot duopolist in the high-low state (26=3 ¼ 8:67). This implies then that¯rm A would produce more than that level (953=102 ¼ 9:34) which then makes the deviation by B unpro¯table.
Conclusion
Our examples show that when potential entrants need to acquire information about the pro¯tability of the market, the number of¯rms that in fact enter is not necessarily determined by the (almost) zero pro¯t condition, even when information acquisition is almost free and¯rms do in fact acquire the information in equilibrium. This casts some doubt on the literature that uses the zero pro¯t condition to derive certain results. For example, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) use the zero pro¯t condition to derive the degree of product diversity. Empirical papers as Bresnahan and Reiss (1988 , 1990 , 1991 estimate market size based on the entry decision of¯rms. As our examples show, however, the fact that only one¯rm enters does not necessarily mean that the market is too small for two¯rms.
We have assumed Cournot competition in the production stage, but our claim that beliefs may bar entry also holds for other oligopolistic competition forms like price competition with di®erentiated products or rent seeking contests.
